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The Dialectics of Competition Law: Sketching
the Ordo-Austrian Approach to Antitrust
Oles ANDRIYCHUK*
This paper explores the qualitative (deontological) approaches to the phenomenon of economic
competition, synthesizing the Ordoliberal and the Austrian perceptions of antitrust economics,
policy and law. It critically addresses the main normative motto of the contemporary antitrust,
embedded in the ethos of consumer/total welfare, as well as the methodological reduction of
competition policy to the empirical analysis. Not contesting the paramount role of economics in
the realm of antitrust, it demonstrates why the phenomenon of competition cannot be narrowed
down to its welfare-generating function. By comparing the regulatory mechanisms of the
competitive process in the real economy and sports it depicts some potential methodological
analogies, between the two realms.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper makes an attempt to recalibrate the main premises of the two
deontological antitrust traditions – the Austrian and Ordoliberal Schools – in a
symbiotic theory, which emphasizes the normative importance of competition,
while recognizing the regulatory limits of its protection.The analysis of regulatory
restraints of free competition reveals that, in addition to its internal dangers, the
competitive process can often violate other significant societal interests and is
therefore subject to limitations and restrictions. However, these regulatory limits
do not influence the nature of competition, but only address the issues of its
application.1 The internal significance of each value goes beyond the regulatory
preferences and should be explored regardless of its actual status on the political
agenda. This methodological premise opens a set of epistemological problems of
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1 Corwin D. Edwards, Big Business and the Policy of Competition 5 (University Cleveland 1956): ‘[F]or
today the anti-trust laws […] are often discussed as though the sole basis for evaluating them were
their bearing upon the attainment of strictly economic goals. Undoubtedly the economic impact of
the policy of competition must be fully considered. But our interest in abundance of goods and
services, full employment of resources, stability, technological progress, and similar economic objectives
cannot justify us in disregarding the political foundations of our free society.’
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balancing, revealing situations where different incompatible values are equally
legitimate and should be protected by the decision-maker.
The analysis of the goals of competition law starts with an articulation of the
methodological point that different approaches to competition should be
conceptually separated into two doctrinal camps – utilitarian and deontological.
The former includes those visions of antitrust that consider the competitive
process as an instrumental value of market economy,2 implying that the efficiency
(for economists), validity (for lawyers) and legitimacy (for political scientists and
practitioners) benchmark of competition is based in its ability to deliver positive
outcomes for the general welfare.3 As Kirchner submits, ‘the efficiency goal as the
ultimate social goal can only be defended in the context of a utilitarian
philosophy’.4 In contrast, the deontological approach perceives the competitive
process itself as a legitimate regulatory value. This approach may include both
purely economic and broader, socio-economic goals.5 The latter cover those who
claim that competition constitutes an important substantive democratic value
that should not be measured only by its economic performance, since either
the competitive process itself 6 or other non-measurable objectives promoted by
antitrust produce significant benefits for society.7 In other words, utilitarians
measure competition externally, whereas deontologists address it from within.
My criticism of the utilitarian perceptions of antitrust is primarily of a
methodological nature, though it contingently conforms to purely legal
arguments.8 The societal importance of the economic interests which utilitarian
views expect the competitive process to promote and enhance is not disputed.The
2 Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 39 Duke L. J. 303(1990):‘This sort of justification
for rules promoting competition, monopoly, or any other state of affairs might appear to be a modern
form of utilitarianism:A rule is Good when its effect is a society that, overall, is better off (wealthier)’.
3 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox – A Policy at War with Itself 51 (Basic Books 1978) :
‘“Competition”, for purposes of antitrust analysis, must be understood as a term of art signifying any
state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree.’
4 Christian Kirchner, Future Competition Law, in The Objectives of Competition Policy European
Competition Law Annual 1997 120 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Laraine L. Laudati eds., Hart
PublishingWorking Paper, 1998).
5 Franz Jürgen Säcker, Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure – Article-by-Article
Commentary 5–6 (Günther Hirsch, Frank Montag & Franz Jürgen Säcker eds., Sweet & Maxwell
2008).
6 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 2d Cir. 1945: ‘[O]ne of [the] purposes of
[the antitrust statutes] was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an
organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.’
7 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust – Retrospective and Prospective:Where Are We Coming
From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 944 (1987) : ‘While a more efficient allocation of
resources would probably result from competition as compared with more direct government
intervention or blatant laissez-faire, […] improved resource allocation was never a norm for antitrust,
nor a condition precedent to antitrust enforcement.’
8 Roger Zäch & Adrian Künzler, The Development of Competition Law – Global Perspective 70 (Roger
Zäch, Andreas Heinemann & Andreas Kellerhals eds., Edward Elgar 2010) (emphasis in the original):
‘In so far as the goal of competition law is at stake, the existing law and its constitutional base are clear.
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value claims of the utilitarian methodology do not pose problem, unlike the
attribution of the task to achieve these economic goals to the competitive process.
The utilitarian rationale implies that competition should only be protected to the
extent of its ability to generate welfare effects;9 hence, rejecting deontological
arguments as inessential, irrelevant or populist.10 The internalization of the
welfare-centred values into the domain of competition has created a paradoxical
situation where one economic phenomenon (i.e., competition) is semantically
covered by the other (welfare). The consequences of this paralogism undermine
the essence of competition. Defining the phenomenon of competition exclusively
in terms of welfare-related effects is inconsistent, since it deprives the
phenomenon of its intrinsic meaning – though competition itself cannot be
operationalized without economic reasoning.11 If the influence of competition on
welfare fully covered the scope of the concept, competition would merely
constitute a taxonomic subsection of welfare and its separate normative
articulation would become meaningless.
2 GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW
The principal normative question of antitrust – ‘whether [… it] should seek to
advance consumer welfare or total welfare, or ought to aim, instead, at protecting
Wettbewerbsfreiheit or the “freedom to compete”’12 – is impossible to address
without answering a broader question – how and to what extent the specific
public policies should correspond to and be conducted in accordance with the
general public interests and goals. There are two conceptual approaches in this
respect: hierarchical and pluralistic.The former subordinates all sectoral policies to
a higher end and assumes that this meta-goal serves as a guiding principle for all
particular policies.This approach is tied to a holistic vision of economic regulation.
It centralizes (administratively, ideologically or both) the sectoral policies under the
Altering the goal from protecting freedom to compete and thus the competitive process to promoting
consumer welfare would thus be an interpretation contra legem et contra constitutionem and would be
illegal.’
9 Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 Yale L. J. 951 (1968): ‘[A]ntitrust is
concerned with competition because a competitive regime provides society with the maximum
output that can be achieved at a given time with the resources available.’
10 Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Rules of Antitrust, 33The Antitrust Bull.
430 (1988).
11 JacobViner, Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis, 44 The Am. Econ. Rev. 897 (1954): ‘There is no
method of influencing ends which falls outside the legitimate scope of economic analysis except the
employment of the hortatory method, the appeal to the emotions, and the appeal to authority.To deny
any influence to economic analysis is to deny any role to reason in the formation by a sensible man of
his system of ends.’
12 Viktor J.Vanberg, ConsumerWelfare,TotalWelfare and Economic Freedom – On the Normative Foundations of
Competition Policy, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, 09/3, 2009, 1.
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common denominator of public economic interests, welfare and growth.13 These
policies are being pursued solely for the benefits of the meta-goals.14 The
autonomous nature of policies, which may diverge from the meta-narrative, is
treated mainly from a consequentialist perspective, which seeks to explore how
they can be instrumentalized for the common good.
Conversely, the alternative approach concentrates on the sectoral specificities
of different policies. Anchored in the pluralist tradition,15 it does not seek to
subordinate all sectoral particularities to a common goal but acknowledges instead
that each policy develops its own, local goal, and is primarily oriented towards its
achievement, which may not correspond to and might even conflict with other
public (meta-) goals. This autonomy is tolerated both from the positive and
normative perspective.The former refers to the lack of knowledge and regulatory
resources to reduce all sectoral policies to the common goal, claiming that such
option is hardly plausible outside of the authoritarian frame of planned economy.
The latter suggests that the autonomy of public policies is beneficial for society as a
whole, since it enables more articulated and independent development of those
public and private sectors that are unlikely to be supported from the centralized,
holistic perspective, since their total usefulness for society would be considered
insignificant.The latter approach implies modesty in antitrust regulation.16
The process of subordination of lower values, interests and policies to the
central meta-goal should not necessarily be performed through strong
administrative intervention. Another means of subordination is based on the
selection of a list of universally accepted, uncontroversial values, which play the
role of a social yardstick for the appropriateness of each policy, either legitimizing
or de-legitimizing given practices. In antitrust such a role is performed by the
standard of consumer welfare. It is hard to find any reason not to support the
interests of consumers, as reflected in their welfare.Yet, the subordination of every
public policy to the achievement of this meta-goal is contentious, at best. The
doctrinal expansion of meta-goals can be observed in many areas of economic
13 Robert H. Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 The Am. Econ. Rev. 242 (1967): ‘My thesis is that
existing statutes can be legitimately interpreted only according to the canons of consumer welfare,
defined as minimizing restrictions of output and permitting, efficiency, however gained, to have its
way.’
14 Joseph Farrell, Complexity, Diversity and Antitrust, 51 Antitrust Bull. 168 (2006): ‘Is monoculture a risk
in competition policy? I think so.’
15 Eleanor M. Fox,The Modernization of Antitrust:A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1169 (1981).
16 Jonathan Faull, The Objectives of Competition Policy, European Competition Law Annual 1997, 12
(Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Laraine L. Laudati eds., Hart Publishing 1998): ‘Competition law can’t save
the world. Other laws and policies address other aspects of the economic system. I believe we should
remain modest in our goals. […] In day to day work, most competition authorities. […] believe that
they are doing their best to ensure that the competitive process is functioning, to prevent at least the
most egregious distortions of competition, and [only] thereby to assist consumer welfare.’
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policy.17 Its logical structure enables a universal reductionist application and
administration.The consequentialist rationale can be observed, for instance, in such
areas as intellectual property – as well as the protection of property in general – it
becomes difficult simply to refer to property rights alone.18 Often it requires such
external, welfare-related justification as the promotion of innovation, a better
distribution of resources or incentives to invest.19
The pluralist vision opposes this approach: it puts forward that sectoral policies
should be treated autonomously and that their particular goals should not be
perceived exclusively as a means to reach the meta-goal. This approach would
argue on a separate evaluation of different entitlements, including welfare effects as
well as the right to compete and property rights – a concept too often
underestimated in antitrust analysis.20
The holistic view is often developed within the utilitarian methodology,
reducing all sectoral economic goals to the common denominator of welfare.The
perception of competition in terms other than its positive impact on economic
welfare is nonsensical from the methodological perspective of welfare economics.21
In contrast, pluralist views are usually deontological and defend the importance of
each particular goal. Pluralists acknowledge that the conflicts between different
goals are inevitable and that they should be addressed by the balancing test.
However, balancing is understood as a complex dialectical process of interaction
between the policies themselves and between the policies and the decision-maker,
and not as a mechanical reduction of them to the utility, which every policy can
eventually generate for the meta-goal.
This perception implies a two-step balancing analysis, where the first step
should focus on the values, taken as ends-in-themselves; at the second stage, these
17 Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist on the
Normative Foundations of Competition Law, Marburg Papers on Economics, No. 09, 2007, 4: ‘From […
the] theoretical perspective [of welfare economics] competitive market is only an instrument used to
achieve efficient allocation’.
18 Maurits Dolmans, Robert O’Donoghue & Paul-John Loewenthal, Are Article 82 EC and Intellectual
Property Interoperable?The State of the Law Pending the Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, 3 Competition
Policy Intl. 107 (2007): ‘The objectives of intellectual property rights […] and competition law are
essentially the same: both promote innovation to the benefit of consumers.’
19 Oles Andriychuk, Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive
Process, 6 Eur. Competition J. 607 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1781512.
20 Rudolph J. Peritz, supra n. 2, at 266.
21 Wolfgang Kerber, supra n. 17, 4: ‘From this welfare-theoretic perspective, it is plainly evident that
efficiency is the ultimate goal, and if agreements between firms or mergers lead to a higher degree of
efficiency, then they should be allowed. Balance between competition and efficiency effects, as it is
assumed in Art. 81 (3) or (as an efficiency defence) in merger control, does not make much sense. It
might be necessary to balance between positive effects on efficiency of a certain business behaviour
(‘pro-competitive effects’) and negative effects on efficiency (‘anticompetitive effects’) but not
between competition and efficiency’.
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values are then cross-checked and balanced. The first step is important to reveal
and articulate the peculiarity of each value. It can be called inside-the-box-thinking.
This is a methodological requirement of coherence.This stage is often missing in
antitrust, since it is considered to be aimed at either the accumulation of welfare
(total welfare standard)22 or its fair distribution (consumer welfare standard).23 Both
still belong to the second step only, since neither represents the essence of the
competitive process itself. To use Barnes’s metaphor,24 the second-step analysis is
concerned only with the increase of the size of the economic pie and/or the
proper distribution of its slices, whereas the first step addresses the problem of its
flavour, appearance and texture, referring to such non-verifiable empirically
societal characteristics as culture and principles of freedom which the market
process is based upon. Flavour-related questions mattered in the historical
development of the goals of antitrust law,25 and they can be neither measured nor
replaced by the efficiency yardstick.26
The main argument of the deontological perception of competition can be
separated into a normative and a methodological part. Both are mutually
dependent.The former suggests that competition constitutes an important societal
value. The latter insists that the value of competition should be perceived
separately from its beneficial and harmful consequences.This second aspect is the
most controversial. It would be against the logic of commonsense to presume that
an act, which significantly distorts some important societal value, can be
considered pro-competitive.Yet, the central claim put forward does not relate to
the authorization of these acts, but merely their perception through the lens of
competition. The two-step test would first address the question whether the
conduct is beneficial for competition or is an expression of competition; after the
inside-the-box analysis is done, it would then question its legitimacy from a
broader societal perspective.
Thus, in sports, virtually any significant distortion of the principle of fair play
would be prohibited at the second level, but it should not prevent a purely
22 Robert H. Bork, supra n. 13, 251.
23 Eugène Buttigieg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest. A Comparative Analysis of US
Antitrust Law and EC Competition Law 3 (Kluwer 2009).
24 David W. Barnes, Antitrust Dialogue on Social Science, Cultural Values, and Merger Law, 33 Antitrust Bull.
624–625 (1988).
25 Eleanor M. Fox, supra n. 15, 1154, (emphasis in the original): ‘[T]he claim that efficiency has been the
goal and the fulcrum of antitrust is weak at best. The values other than efficiency that underlie the
commitment to power dispersion, economic opportunity, and competition as market governor
demand equal attention.’
26 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, supra n. 7, 956–959: ‘[T]he Chicago School defines
competition in terms of efficiency; defines efficiency as the absence of inefficiency; defines inefficiency
in terms of artificial output restraint; […] and thus concludes that any activity that does not
demonstrably limit output is efficient, and therefore pro-competitive.Thus, it “proves” that almost all
business activity is efficient.’
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hypothetical (in terms of practical implications) but very important (in terms of
methodological consistency) first-step analysis whether the prohibited rule
enhances competition. Arguably, some actions that are against the principle of fair
play do indeed enhance competition. They are seldom re-authorized, but such
option is always available either directly – the authorized fights between the
hockey players which render the game more attractive – or implicitly. The
threshold of authorization depends on the context of the market and its proper
definition goes beyond the scope of a theoretical analysis.
This methodological claim merely disentangles the instrumental aspects of
values from their very essence. It does not argue in favour of any of them. It would
be in accordance with this methodology for instance to recognize competition in
all its forms as belonging to the phenomenon as such, and then prohibit some of
its parts as unacceptable for public purposes,27 and it would be against this
methodology to claim that some actions are pro-competitive to the extent that
they (can) increase societal welfare28 or even that the lack of consumer harm
immunizes anticompetitive conduct from antitrust sanctions29 – even if the real
normative outcomes for the competitive process might be more beneficial in the
second case.30 It is also in accordance with this methodology to deny outright that
the protection of the individual freedom to compete lies beyond the boundaries of
antitrust31 (taken as an economic calculus exercise). But then the discussion would
continue not in the realm of the methodology of balancing but in the realm of the
normative definition of competition.
27 JohnVickers,Concepts of Competition, 47 Oxford Economic Papers, New Series 4 (1995).
28 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007): ‘The rule [of reason]
distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and
those with pro-competitive effect that are in the consumer’s best interest.’
29 John Temple Lang & Robert O’Donoghue, The Concept of an Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82 EC,
Global Competition Law Centre Research Papers on Art. 82 EC, 2005, 47: ‘It could be argued, with
some force, that […] there is no harm to the “structure of competition” that, ultimately, does not also
lead to direct consumer harm. […] Put differently, there can be no case for intervention under
competition law where there is harm to the competitive process, but none to consumers.’
30 Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of
Intramarket Second-BestTradeoffs, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 923 (2000) : ‘Under contemporary doctrine, restraints
of trade can be justified if the restraints are “pro-competitive”, but what does it mean to be
“pro-competitive”? […] The answers that the Court often gives mark a departure from structural
understandings of competition. Conduct is pro-competitive if it increases output, reduces price, or
enables the parties to provide a product or service that would not otherwise be available.’ See, e.g.,
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102–104 (1984) ‘[…] It is easier to reconcile these criteria with
a total welfare standard than with a competition-based standard.’
31 Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 370 (1965) : ‘If the
social-policy argument makes sense, then we had better drop the per se rule in favour of one
permitting the defence that cartels benefit small businessmen. Coexistence of the social-policy
argument with the pro-competitive rules would introduce so vague a factor that prediction of the
courts’ behaviour would become little more than a guessing game.’
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The second major problem is disciplinary. It concerns the selection of an
adequate apparatus to address antitrust issues.32 The value of the competitive
process in antitrust is usually defined in non-efficiency, deontological terms. From
the perspective of economics, non-efficiency goals are those, which are difficult or
impossible to prove empirically, and/or could not be fitted into an equilibrium
analysis.33 Deontological values are non-quantifiable and ‘this [welfare-economics]
approach cannot deal with constitutional issues’.34 A possible solution is offered by
constitutional economics, which perceives citizens’ will as consumers’ preference,
internalizing thereby the broader notion of political rights into economic
theoretical discourse,35 translating political values into the language of economics.
Despite its significant impact on the positive analysis of liberty through the lens of
economics, the normative implications of such a translation are rather limited,36
since positivist rationality fails to explain the irreducibly deontological origins of
rights.
Leaving aside the difficulty of measuring quantitative values of efficiency,37 as
well as the whole spectrum of terminological complications arising from the
simplified perception of the goals of antitrust,38 the neoclassical methodology of
equilibrium economics cannot deal with non-quantifiable values.39 It cannot
address them in another way than by reducing them to some measurable
characteristics.40 Kerber clarifies in this respect that ‘[f]or many economists it is
hard to understand that there might be a real trade off between competition and
efficiency’.41 From this perspective, antitrust policy faces a dilemma: it can either
32 Maher M. Dabbah, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy 57 (Cambridge University Press 2003):
‘[A]ntitrust law is interdisciplinary in nature. [… T]he involvement of various disciplines in antitrust
law and policy and their development should be welcomed.’
33 Paul J.McNulty,EconomicTheory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q. J. Econ. 639–640 (1968).
34 Christian Kirchner, supra n. 4, 119.
35 Wolfgang Kerber, supra n. 17, 16: ‘As a consequence, it is possible to argue also from an economic
perspective that competition law should not only take into account the effects of restrictive
agreements, mergers, and business behaviour on consumer welfare but also on a set of protected rights
of competitors and up- and downstream firms, which might suffer losses through the infringements of
these rights’.
36 Norman P. Barry, Unanimity, Agreement, and Liberalism: A Critique of James Buchanan’s Social Philosophy
12Pol.Theory 580 (1984).
37 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, ConsumerWelfare, andTechnological Progress 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1030 (1987): ‘[C]onsidered ex post, production efficiencies are the most measurable of
the three types of efficiencies, while innovation and allocative efficiencies present severe measurement
problems. Considered ex ante, none of the efficiencies appears measurable’.
38 Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, supra n. 7, 969–988.
39 Maher M. Dabbah, supra n. 32, at 18: ‘Economists […] equate competition with impersonal
price-making, the most impersonal being the ‘purest’, whereas lawyers tend to view competition as
rivalry among firms to sell goods or services’.
40 David W. Barnes, supra n. 24, 624: ‘The nonefficiency goals are fairly characterized as lacking both
serious theoretical foundation and substantial empirical support. How should we form policy in the
absence of a rigorous analytical foundation when the nonefficiency have intuitive appeal’?
41 Wolfgang Kerber, supra n. 17, 4.
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consider competition as a purely deontological value, refusing thereby cost-benefit
economic methods, or transform the competitive process into an economically
definable value. The former approach is unrealistic because the dominant role of
economics in antitrust is undisputable.The latter approach is false, as the reduction
of the competitive process to its outcomes for consumers negates the very essence
of competition.
The solution to this conundrum is twofold. Alongside the welfare-standard,
economic analysis should apply other empirical techniques, which would help to
articulate the competitive process independently from its effects on consumers and
other derivative goals. A suggested yardstick could be the intensity of the
competitive process, the level of engagement of rivals, as well as pre-Chicago
structural analysis of the markets, though from the empirical economic perspective
the assumption that ‘the intensity of the competitive process is a function of the
market form which […] is defined […] is nowadays considered obsolete’,42 as
‘general correlations between market structures and market performance are
difficult to prove’.43 However, game theory, behavioural economics and IO can
conduct various types of the experimental research without being predetermined
by the yardstick of welfare/efficiency, which reveals the potential coupling points
between the normative premises of the deontological antitrust schools and the
methodology of the various Post-Chicago approaches.
The second alternative is the elimination of the monopoly of economics in
antitrust analysis. Competition law should be open to the non-empirical
deontological methods of other social sciences;44 all of them, including economics
should ‘capture[…] the pulse of the law’,45 acknowledging its internal rationale,
and not reducing the law to their own apparatus.46 Law, and antitrust law in
particular, always deals with non-quantifiable values, and law can never be reduced
42 Franz Jürgen Säcker, above, 14.
43 Wolfgang Kerber & Ulrich Schwalbe, in Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure –
Article-by-Article Commentary 221 (Günther Hirsch, Frank Montag, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Sweet &
Maxwell 2008).
44 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, 5 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 13 (2002): ‘The
curious fact that the merits of competition cannot be empirically verified in precisely those cases in
which it is of interest is also shared by the discovery procedures of science in general’.
45 Eleanor M. Fox,The Battle for the Sole of Antitrust, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 923 (1987).
46 Pierre Legrand, Econocentrism, 59 U. Toronto L. J. 216 (2009): ‘Those who claim to have elicited a
common denominator transcending laws and the places of laws, allowing for a mathematization of law,
partaking in some sort of epistemological bilingualism, and permitting a rigorous Archimedean
assessment (and ranking) of laws in terms of ‘efficiency’ are, in effect, positing a range of audacious
postulates. […] While law is indeed thoroughly cultural, as any serious archaeological research must
reveal, economics is taken to operate on a more elevated plane, and on a more elevated ethical plane
also, within a ‘beyond’ of culture, if you will, and specifically within a beyond of the law’s naïveté or
capriciousness as it manifests itself locally’.
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to a cost-benefit calculus.47 The relations between the solutions suggested by
different disciplines should be taken under the balancing test.48 More convincing
arguments would have priority, regardless of the methodology through which they
are built.49 The difference between these approaches is not crucial,50 and the
arguments are usually developed by mixing the methods of both.
In addition, non-efficiency-based methods cover a much broader spectrum of
values than the right to compete, including market integration, environment, social
cohesion and innovations as well as many others qualitative non-economic goals.51
All values can be measured empirically and addressed theoretically, yet not all values
can be reduced to empirically testable data, and even the reduction of empirically
testable values is a methodological premise, which includes elements of
simplification or arbitrariness,52 since neither the welfare of consumers nor the
wellbeing of society can be measured by economic methods exclusively. A purely
economic analysis cannot provide an ultimate definition of consumer welfare, or
protect it,53 and it does not eliminate the necessity of choices.54 The same holds
true in respect to the benchmark of efficiency.55 It is a matter of definition either
47 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, A Legal Theory Without Law: Posner v. Hayek on Economic Analysis of Law,
Walter Eucken Institut, Beiträge zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik 174, Tübingen, Mohr
Siebeck, 2007, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1168422, accessed on Dec. 23,
2009, 34–35: ‘Legal rules in a free order are not end-related and must abstract from the multitude of
individual plans they are to coordinate. In the economic analysis of law the key concepts – rational
choice and efficiency – are end-related. The term efficiency is used to denote the allocation of
resources in which value is maximized. […] This implies that the end-relation of rules of individual
conduct is taken for granted, the end being the maximisation of wealth’.
48 John J. Flynn, Legal Reasoning,Antitrust Policy and the Social ‘Science’ of Economics, 33 Antitrust Bull. 721
(1988): ‘The legal process is constantly confronted with reconciling competing and conflicting moral
values underlying its rules in light of the specific realities of individual disputes, role definitions, and
the consequences of the decision. Indeed, this function is central to the legal process’.
49 John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of A Competitive Process, 35 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 898
(1990): ‘[Different visions of competition] often involve balancing concerns for liberty and equality in
the complex process of reconciling the need for protecting individualism and community’.
50 DavidW. Barnes, supra n. 24, 623.
51 John J. Flynn,‘Discussion’ in DavidW. Barnes, supra n. 24, 638:‘I guess the best summary I have seen of
those goals […] is that which Professor Eleanor Fox derived from her study of the legislative history
of the Sherman Act, namely: (1) dispersion of economic power for its own sake; (2) freedom and
opportunity to compete on merits; (3) satisfaction of consumers (which would embrace some of the
values put forth by economic analysis); and (4) protection of the competitive process as market
governor’.
52 Richard S. Markovits, On the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions, 47 Antitrust Bull. 573–577
(2002).
53 Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of Antitrust In the New Millennium, 68 Antitrust L. J. 556
(2001):‘There […] is no such thing as an objectively determined consumer welfare’.
54 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 George Washington L. Rev. 6
(1982):‘Most antitrust rules work to the benefit of some consumers but to the detriment of others’.
55 Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, New York University Centre for Law, Economics and
Organisation, Law & Economics Research Paper Series,Working Paper No. 09-26, 2009, 6: ‘There is
no one thing called ‘efficiency’. Conducts, transactions, and markets have efficiency and inefficiency
properties at the same time, and the relative dimensions of each property are affected by assumptions
regarding how well markets work’.
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to ascribe the balancing of multiple goals to antitrust itself,56 developing thereby
‘the multiple objectives of antitrust’,57 including inter alia references to the purely
deontological notions of justice58 and fairness,59 or (alternatively) to limit antitrust
to the issues of the competitive process alone.This research proposes to adopt the
latter path and to contextualize this narrowly defined competition policy into the
broader regulatory framework, balancing the competitive process against other
important societal values.
3 PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF THEWELFARE-CENTRED GOALS
As has been argued above, the reduction of the concept of the competitive process
to its welfare-generating effects solves neither normative nor methodological
difficulties in antitrust.The difference between consumer and total welfare may be
defined in ideological rather than methodological terms: the former is directed to
the interests of consumers sensu stricto,60 while the latter is more concerned with
a total increase in welfare which would subsequently lead to an increase in
efficiency and benefit consumers. This means that the latter often uses the
benchmark of the former. The methodological question of the definition of
welfare is unclear be it from the perspective of antitrust policy in general or
antitrust economics in particular. While acknowledging the role of Bork in
developing the theory of consumer welfare, Orbach, for instance, remarks that the
use of the term ‘welfare’ is not correct from an economic perspective and that
sound economic analysis should refer to consumer and total surplus respectively;61
the former referring to the interests of buyers and the latter to those of both
buyers and sellers alike – thus, ‘[t]he yardstick for measuring the efficiency of the
market outcome is simply the sum of consumer and producer surplus’.62 Peritz
observes in this respect a misleading connotation of the term.63 Bork himself
56 Oliver Budzinski, Monoculture versus Diversity in Competition Economics, 32 Cambridge J. Econ. 317
(2008): ‘[S]ustainable pluralism of competition theories is an imperative for science and no temporary
problem on the path to the ultimate solution’.
57 Harlan M. Blake &William K. Jones, Toward aThree-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 422
(1965).
58 Louis B. Schwartz, ‘Justice’ and other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076 (1979).
59 Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust:What Fairness Means and Why It Matters, 77 Marq. L. Rev.
266 (1993).
60 John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, ‘The Chicago School’s Foundation is Flawed: Antitrust
Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency’, University of Baltimore Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2009-17, 2009, 3: ‘The primary goal of antitrust actually is to prevent ‘unfair’ transfers of wealth from
purchasers to firms with market power’.
61 BarakY.Orbach,The Antitrust ConsumerWelfare Paradox, 7 J. Competition L. & Econ. 138 (2010).
62 Roger J.Van den Bergh & Peter D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics:A Comparative
Perspective 23 (Sweet & Maxwell 2006).
63 Rudolph J. Peritz, supra n. 2, 311: ‘Because the phrase “consumer welfare” shares semantic elements
with the Ralph Nader consumerist movement, there has been a feeling that Robert Bork, Richard
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recognizes that his ‘understanding of the benefits of competition for consumers is
somewhat inaccurate, but that does not affect the fact that this is usually the
primary value we have in mind’.64 His more severe critics argue that Bork’s
‘consumer welfare’ has ‘little or nothing to do with the welfare of true
consumers’.65 The relation between the terms welfare and surplus is not
synonymic. The former has a more articulated ethical meaning, while the latter
remains within the realm of economic analysis.66 The same holds true for another
yardstick, which is used in economics – the concept of efficiency.67
Accordingly, measuring welfare with the economic yardstick is more difficult
than measuring surplus; the phenomenon of welfare, unlike that of surplus is not
all about maximization. Arguably the former task goes beyond the scope of
antitrust’s economic apparatus.68 The importance of such limitation of neoclassical
economics lies in its clarity. Antitrust should not primarily address welfare-related
concerns and concentrate more on the measurable data of consumer and/or total
surplus. Fox observes in this respect the selectivity of the Chicago School, which
applies its welfare argumentation only if it prevents regulatory intervention and
ignores it whenever the intervention can increase welfare.69 This epistemological
characteristic of the Chicago School also shows that the notion of consumer
welfare concerns broader issues of consumer wellbeing, which is impossible to
perceive as a specific task of antitrust, inasmuch as it constitutes a meta-goal;
namely, responsible economic governance in general.The limited attention paid to
consumer surplus downgrades antitrust analysis to a form of economic
pragmatism, revealing thereby more clearly the disciplinary boundaries of
economics, and proving that competition should be addressed from different
Posner, and other price theorists share the Naderites’ concerns for consumers. Nothing could be
farther from the truth, we have learned. Where Naderites call for commercial firms to take social
responsibility […,] price theorists believe that firms only have a responsibility to their shareholders to
maximize earnings’.
64 Robert H. Bork, supra n. 3, 61.
65 Robert H. Lande, above, 434.
66 Anne Perrot, Appropriation of the Legal System by Economic Concepts: Should Conflicting Goals be
Considered?, in Economic Theory and Competition Law 132 (Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joël Monéger
eds., Edward Elgar 2009): ‘[I]t is difficult for competition authorities to take into account objectives
that are not strictly in line with short-term consumer surplus’.
67 Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition, 37 Q. J. Econ. 581 (1923): ‘Even in physics and
engineering,‘efficiency’ is strictly a value category; there is no such thing as mechanical efficiency’.
68 Barak Y. Orbach, above, 141: ‘Antitrust law does not even pretend to address welfare optimization
issues. Its methodology is all about surplus – perceived values in particular markets’.
69 Eleanor M. Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1717 (1986): ‘It is true, as Judge
Easterbrook points out, that Chicagoans invoke dynamic effects and possibilities. But they do so only
when reliance on the dynamic effect will lead to nonintervention. Thus, Chicagoans will rely on a
free-rider effect to argue that producers should be able to fix resale prices. […] But Chicagoans do not
invoke dynamic effects (e.g., preserving rivalrous interactions to enhance inventiveness) to support
antitrust intervention’.
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methodological viewpoints – but not rejecting the leading role of economics in
the process.
Another aspect of the same problem should be re-emphasized, namely the
homonymy between the term competition as perceived in classical economic
theory – and as it is taken in the political and cultural domains – and the term
competition in its neoclassical sense.70 While the former encompasses the idea of a
dynamic rivalry, the latter is a part of a purely methodological analysis.71 The state
of perfect competition is an indispensable condition of equilibrium economics,72
which implies an ‘imaginary construction’73 of a hypothetical situation when
demand meets supply, the situation when ‘the equality of marginal cost and
price’74 is achieved. Every economic theory is either directly or implicitly
influenced by this basic premise,75 which in turn downgrades the normative aim
of rivalry dynamism of the competitive process.76 This might be partly due to the
fact that from the neoclassical economic perspective the reference to the normative
value of freedom is considered as a return to the theoretical past of economics,
basing this perception essentially on the cumulative perception of knowledge,77 as
opposed to its cyclical view, which is typical for other social science, and which is
the approach par excellence in philosophy. Competition for equilibrium-based
analysis is not a normative aim, but only an important methodological part of the
economic reasoning.78
70 John R. Hicks, Wealth and Welfare 138 (Basil Blackwell 1981): ‘The liberal, or non-interference,
principles of the classical (Smithian or Ricardian) economists were not, in the first place, economic
principles; they were an application to economics of principles that were thought to apply to a much
wider field.The contention that economic freedom made for economic efficiency was no more than a
secondary support’.
71 Mark Blaug, Is Competition Such a Good Thing? Static Efficiency versus Dynamic Efficiency, 19 Rev. Indus.
Org. 37 (2001): ‘[I]f there is recognition of change at all, it is change in the sense of a new stationary
equilibrium of endogenous variables in response to an altered set of exogenous variables; but
comparative statics is still an end-state conception of economics’.
72 Paul J. McNulty, above, 642: ‘Perfect competition, the only clearly and rigorously defined concept of
competition to be found in the corpus of economic theory, which is free of all traces of business
behaviour associated with ‘monopolistic’ elements, means simply the existence of an indefinitely large
number of noncompeting firms’.
73 Ludwig von Mises,Human Action – ATreatise on Economics 237 (William Hodge and Co. 1949).
74 Thomas J. Di Lorenzo & Jack C. High, Antitrust and Competition, Historically Considered 26 Econ.
Inquiry 428 (1988).
75 JohnVickers, above, 7: ‘Perfect competition (including competitive equilibrium) models are extremely
useful for analyzing all sorts of economic issues’.
76 Friedrich A. von Hayek, supra n. 42, 10, (emphasis in the original): ‘[T]he absurdity of the conventional
approach proceeding from a state in which all essential conditions are assumed to be known – a state
that theory curiously designates as perfect competition, even though the opportunity for the activity
we call competition no longer exists. Indeed, it is assumed that such activity has already performed its
function’.
77 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Freedom, Reason, andTradition 68 Ethics 231 (1958).
78 For a more detailed analysis of the difficulties, related to the homonymy problem, see Oles
Andriychuk, The Concept of Perfect Competition as the Law of Economics: Addressing the Homonymy
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Economic approaches that emphasize the limited nature of equilibrium-based
analysis79 do not deny its methodological importance but they question its normative
part. The notion of competitive process is not materially embedded, and most
mainstream economic theories do not address it as a topic of research.The stylized
or improved version of the concept of perfect competition refers to the notion of
workable competition, which again perceives the competitive process as a means
which is either tolerated (so far as it does not harm the normative premises and the
framework of workability) or addressed only in its reduced, welfare-related form,
referring to the formula ‘what is good for welfare – is pro-competitive; what is not
– is anticompetitive’. The economic definition of the competitive process may
presume rivalry,80 but it always circumscribes the normative protection of
competition to its positive consequences for measurable values, it does not
consider any normative value in competition itself.
3.1 THE COMPETITIVE BALANCE
As to the method which can be used to define competition separately from the
beneficial incomes, which it generates,81 the role of the rivalry process, perceived
as ‘an effective competition structure’82 or as ‘a medium of interrelation’83 should
be explored. The analogy between competition and sports – as well as games in
general – could be of use. It is often used in economic,84 as well as in legal
Problem, 62 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 523–538 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001319.
79 David B.Audretsch,William J. Baumol & Andrew E. Burke, Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets, 19
Intl. J. Indus. Org. 614 (2001): ‘In a dynamic economy competition in product and process innovations
may have a more significant effect on welfare, at least in the long run, than does any likely variation in
price’.
80 John M. Clark, What Is Competition?, 3 U. J. Bus. 220 (1925): ‘[C]ompetition extends to many forms of
rivalry, most of which may be treated as subsidiary to the basic struggle of business enterprises making
and selling goods, but which are nevertheless very different from each other. There is buyers’ and
sellers’ competition, one-sided and two-sided competition, competition in price, in quality, in
advertising and selling, and in securing access to the means of production. There is competition of
consumers for goods, competition of different classes of workers to secure jobs, to hold the jobs they
have secured, and to obtain advancement’.
81 Associated Gen. 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983): ‘Coercive activity that prevents its victims from making free
choices between market alternatives is inherently destructive of competitive conditions and may be
condemned even without proof of its actual market effect’.
82 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Inc v Commission [1973] ECR 215,
para. 12.
83 Oliver Budzinski,Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition, 14 Const. Political Econ. 227 (2003).
84 Frank H. Knight, The Sickness of Liberal Society, 56 Ethics 91 (1946): ‘‘[F]or an understanding of the
social ethic of liberalism, its general principles and their application to political and economic life, it is
highly important to consider carefully the phenomena of play and the cultural pursuits’.
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analysis.85 It has been suggested that ‘the final element in any contest [… is] the
inherent unpredictability of [its] outcomes’.86
For many distinguished antitrust thinkers the protection of the competitive
process as an end in and of itself is ‘analytically disastrous’.87 Yet, the same analytical
approach shows that the multiplicity of societal goals directly related to antitrust
cannot be reduced to a single denominator, and that the plurality of values requires
a plurality of antitrust-related goals,88 treated analytically as separate. The
competitive process in such synthetically separate analysis has an important, if not
primordial, place.The importance of unpredictability (and therefore undefinability)
of the competitive process is emphasized by the evolutionary economics. Farrell
calls this feature the ‘dark matter of competition’.89 Kerber explains the
implications of this Hayekian approach, submitting that (i) competition can be
perceived as a process ‘in which previously unknown knowledge is generated, and
(ii) the multiplicity and diversity […] might be crucial for the effectiveness of
competition as a discovery procedure’.90 Budzinski characterizes this approach as
an open-ended continuum of experimentation, considering it as ‘a research process
in which the competitors try to improve their always limited, situative, and fallible
knowledge on economic problem solutions’.91
Antitrust in this respect can also internalize the notion of competitive balance
used, for instance, in sports economics. The competitive balance is a situation in
team sports, where the governing body – sports league or federation –
intentionally maintains the correlative difference between the clubs, not allowing
the discrepancy between them to exceed the established limit.A similar perception
of the competitive process exists in economics,92 but it is mainly considered as
85 Giorgio DelVecchio, Truth and Untruth in Morals and Law, in Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies:
Essays in Honour of Roscoe Pound 150 (Paul Sayre ed., Oxford University Press 1981).
86 Stan Metcalfe, Ronald Ramlogan, Elvira Uyarra, ‘Economic Development and the Competitive
Process’, Centre on Regulation and CompetitionWorking Paper Series, No. 36, 2002, p. 12.
87 Robert H. Bork, supra n. 3, 59.
88 Rudolph J. Peritz, supra n. 2, 266: ‘[W]e can make antitrust law workable […] by viewing it as the
product of tensions between the rhetorics of competition policy and private property rights. […]This
structured analysis of antitrust discourse, which I call a ‘genealogy’ or a ‘counter-history’ […] can
revitalize an antitrust economy of pluralism’.
89 Joseph Farrell, above, pp. 168–169.
90 Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations 173 (Josef
Drexl,Wolfgang Kerber & Rupprecht Podszun eds., Edward Elgar 2011).
91 Oliver Budzinski, An Evolutionary Theory of Competition, University of Southern Denmark -
Department of Environmental and Business Economics Working Paper, 2004, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=534862 accessed on Feb. 25, 2011, 4.
92 Robert Liefmann, Monopoly and Competition as the Basis of a Government Trust Policy, 29 Q. J. Econ. 318
(1915).
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outside the normative and methodological premises of welfare economics, either
internalizing it to the concept of efficiency or ignoring the concept outright.93
Among the most common mechanisms for designing competitive balance are
the following: draft system in North American professional leagues, which implies
the worst team’s priority in signing for new players at the end of the season;94
seeding in draws, which prevents the possibility for the strongest teams to
participate in the early stages of knockout competition;95 revenue sharing, which
binds the most commercially successful teams to redistribute part of their incomes
with other participants of competition in order to maintain the integrity necessary
for the league;96 salary cap, which prevents the richest clubs to sign the most
skilful players;97 blackout rules, which prevent broadcasting of the most
commercially attractive games of the tournament at the time when a local team
plays its game in order to avoid the conflict of interests for potential viewers;98
financial contributions to the relegated teams, which enables the least successful
teams to maintain their financial stability for the following years, affording them a
second chance to get promoted to the higher league in the following seasons;99
collective selling of broadcasting rights, which helps to maintain coherency in
distribution between the most and the less lucrative content of the tournament;100
compensation to the clubs which delegate their players to the national team,
benefiting the clubs which were temporarily disadvantaged due to delegation of
their best athletes to the national team; limitation of the mobility of the players by
the reserve clauses, which does not allow the athlete to switch teams according to
his will, preventing thereby the situational disproportions between the clubs;101
joint marketing which implies that the league promotes the tournament as a
whole by single branding and by packaging media rights, enabling thereby a more
proportional sharing of the audience between the different matches, and not
93 Wolfgang Kerber, supra n. 17, 10: ‘Although most economists view economic freedom as very
important, so far no convincing solutions have developed how to integrate an analysis of economic
freedom with an industrial economics approach to competition’.
94 Mohamed El-Hodiri & James Quirk, An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League, 79 J. Pol. Econ.
1304 (1971).
95 Allen J. Schwenk, What is the CorrectWay to Seed a KnockoutTournament?, 107 Am.Mathematical Mthly.
140 (2000).
96 Stefan Szymanski & Stefan Késenne, Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports 52 J.
Indus. Econ. 165 (2004).
97 Stefan Késenne, The Impact of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports, 47 Scottish J Pol. Econ. 423
(2000).
98 Harry M. Shooshan, Confrontation with Congress: Professional Sports and theTelevision Antiblackout Law, 25
Syracuse L. Rev. 713 (1974).
99 Roger G.Noll,The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues:The Case of English Football, 3
J. Sports Econ. 170 (2002).
100 Martin Cave & RobertW.Crandall, Sports Rights and the Broadcast Industry, 111 Econ. J. 5 (2001).
101 Stephen Dobson & John Goddard, Performance, Revenue, and Cross Subsidization in the Football League,
1927–1994, 51 Econ. Hist. Rev. New Series, 765 (1998).
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allowing the broadcasters and viewers to cherry-pick the games of the most
attractive clubs only.102 In addition the rich literature in game theory103 and
lottery analysis104 also provides purely economical standards for modelling
contests.
Apart from the regulatory instruments, which are external to the contest as
such, the internal rules of the game itself are designed in a manner to promote the
elements of unpredictability, rivalry and performance of the teams.The task of this
instrument is neither to create equality between the teams nor to increase their
economic performance; it does not have one end-state. Both, equality and
performance are important tasks in sports, but they are treated methodologically
separately from the competitive balance, while remaining closely connected to it.
The principle of the competitive balance is a dynamic, process-oriented goal; it
does not pursue clear-cut objectives, though some of its methods are defined in
this clear-cut manner. There is no best competitive balance: it encompasses both
elements of unpredictability and competitive advantages, which the stronger teams
have over their weaker opponents. Its task is not to eliminate the differences
between the strength of the teams, but to create coherence between them, to make
their involvement into sports more unpredictable and entertaining, which is the
essence of sports contests, a notion very similar to economic competition in this
respect.The purpose of it is the creation, protection and promotion of competition
for its own sake.This method shows that irony towards the protection of freedom
is not always correct on the substance,105 inasmuch as ‘competition is valued for its
own sake, as the economic equivalent of political democracy’.106
The competitive balance then obviously brings in monetised values, like
revenues from attendance and selling media rights, sponsorship agreements and
other marketing activities, but these consequences are indirect.The primary task of
the competitive balance is competition.This analogy should not be taken literally.
The difference between public economic policy and professional sports is
important. The role of competition is not self-evident in economic life, while
sports contest could not exist without competition, as it is embedded in rivalry by
definition. However, the suggested analogy does not address normative issues and
the substantive comparison therefore is irrelevant at this point. It is a proposal for
102 Daniel D. Manson, What Is the Sports Product and Who Buys It? The Marketing of Professional Sports
Leagues, 33 Eur. J.Mktg. 403 (1999).
103 Ken Binmore,Modelling Rational Players: Part I, 3 Econ. & Phil. 179 (1987).
104 John Morgan, Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries, 67 Rev. Econ. Stud. 761 (2000).
105 Robert H. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 415 (1965): ‘Suppose that, due to
economies of scale, an industry of 500 firms becomes one of twenty. Is your liberty curtailed? […] Is it
the task of antitrust, in the service of the enlargement of individual liberty, to require the dissolution
of the twenty firms into 500, or perhaps 1000?’
106 Corwin D. Edwards, supra n. 1, 4.
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the economic methodology of measuring, defining, protecting and promoting the
competitive process, as it is performed in sports economics. It does not compare
the role of competition in sports and in economic life, but merely transposes an
instrument available in economics of professional sports to the public economic
activities.
The significance of the competitive process in the economic sphere is
developed by a normative and not a methodological argument. It refers to the
constitutional role that competition plays in liberal democracies and is not directly
relevant to the suggested analogy, although the structural similarities between the
two models are substantial. These similarities between sports competition and
antitrust should not be underestimated. Budzinski argues that in sports unlike in
economic relations competition exists for its own sake, suggesting that while ‘in
economic competition there is no definite goal, or, in other words, the race never
ends. Instead of victory, the race itself represents the “goal”’.107 However, the
interest of sports teams is not in winning trophies for their own sake, but in the
continuous process of winning. In a temporal dimension the process can be
extended to the contribution to the historical development of the club’s traditions
or conversely reduced to the winning in each episode of a game.The outcomes of
the matches or results of the seasons are only the most obvious tasks of sports
competition.Trophies and titles serve as benchmarks of success, but they cannot be
reduced to the very essence of the competitive process.Thus competition in sports
economics as well as other sectors of the economy is present in many dimensions
and at many levels.108
The notion of competitive balance should not be confused with the balancing
act either.The task of the former is to maintain the process while the latter aims at
achieving a certain result via the balancing process. In the former the task is to
maintain the balanced equilibrium between the teams, whereas the latter perceives
balancing as a way to solve clashes between values. Both are equally important for
the purposes of competition; the former refers to its essence, while the latter
primarily addresses the necessity of proportional protection/restriction of
competition in its correlation with other important public values. The latter,
however, can be also perceived as a part of the competitive process itself, if taken as
a competition between the different values for regulatory protection/restriction.
Ultimately, the competitive balance in professional sports provides an illustration of
economic analysis of the competitive process and serves as a counterargument to
the claims that the impossibility to measure competition prevents its proper
107 Oliver Budzinski, supra n. 56, 297.
108 Phedon Nicolaides, An Essay on Economics and Competition Law of the European Community, 27 Leg.
Issues Econ. Integration 14 (2000) : ‘[F]irms compete on many different dimensions. Constraining one
or more dimension does not necessarily result in the weakening of overall competition.’
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economic analysis and that this justifies evaluating competition solely from the
perspective of its impact on the surplus-based economic values. It does not address
the issue of specificity of professional sports and its specific legal status in antitrust.
The notion that the competitive balance may serve as an objective of antitrust
policy has been originally contested by Bork, who defined it in twofold terms:
either (i) preserving rivalry for its own sake – rejecting this goal outright, arguing
that ‘[o]ur society is founded upon the elimination of rivalry’;109 or (ii)
maximizing competition – suggesting that this would ‘require the dissolution of
virtually all industrial and commercial organizations’.110 Bork’s analysis is based
on a purely holistic perception, which subordinates all economic policies, relevant
to antitrust to the sole goal of consumer welfare. Some of his critics also use the
holistic argument of the meta-goal of antitrust, suggesting that otherwise it will
end up being a ‘meaningless hodgepodge of conflicting, inconsistent, and
politicised mini-policies’.111 Another version of this holistic approach combines
the main goals of antitrust ‘into a single working principle’ of antitrust welfare.112
These approaches may indeed provide some clarity, but clarity is not the exclusive
virtue of complex economic relationships.113 They inevitably contain the elements
of multiple goals, variety of interests and diversity of approaches.114 This
multiplicity of antitrust-related objectives is embraced in the pluralistic
methodology, which enables to address them under the balancing test, without
making ex ante judgements on the normative significance of each value,
internalizing indeterminacy into antitrust analysis, rather than considering it to be
an obstacle for decision-making process.
4 TOWARDS ORDO-AUSTRIANISM
The role of competition in the market process has been mostly emphasized by the
representatives of the two deontological antitrust schools: Ordoliberalism and
Austrianism. Despite significant ideological differences between them, their
development was to a large extent cross-fertilizing, creating a ground for debates
109 Robert H. Bork, supra n. 3, 58.
110 Robert H. Bork, supra n. 13, 252.
111 Herbert J. Hovenkamp,Antitrust Policy after Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 234 (1985).
112 Joseph F. Brodley, supra n. 37, 1023–1024 (emphasis in the original).
113 Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 890
(1987): ‘There are varieties of modern thought-political, sociological, economic, humanistic. To be
worth reading, an antitrust opinion, like any thoughtful essay, must take shape and colour from one or
more of these sources’.
114 Oliver Budzinski, supra n. 56, 295:‘Diversity in competition economics is advocated in two ways. First,
competition economics is empirically characterized by a considerable pluralism of theories and policy
paradigms. Second, it is demonstrated that this diversity of theories is theoretically beneficial for future
scientific progress.’
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about the methods of protecting competition.115 Both contributed to the
analytical disentanglement of competition from welfare. These two schools can
hardly be jointed into a coherent theoretical vision of antitrust, but the arguments
of both may be perceived as mutually-invigorating, if taken from a dynamic
dialectical perspective. The dialectics of Ordo-Austrianism is based upon three
main polarities: (i) competition as an individual right; (ii) competition as a
collective right; (iii) the role of government in the regulation of the competitive
process.116
Competition as an individual right is perceived by Ordoliberalism separately
from economic efficiency, which it generates,117 primarily from the perspective of
the underprivileged market-players. The individual right to compete should be
broader than the possibility for successful companies to profit from their
entrepreneurial discovery or natural monopolistic status. The right to compete
should be also provided for other, less successful companies.118 This approach is
similar to the intentionalist perception of antitrust, which claims that ‘intervention
to remedy imbalances of wealth and power is necessary to insure true individual
freedom’.119 Individuals are perceived ‘as ends in themselves and not as the means
of another’s welfare’.120 This entails the necessity of designing the rules, which
both actively protect competition and enhance it. The regulatory intervention in
this respect is not necessarily concerned with the limitation of market freedom,121
but should be rather seen as ‘regulation as framing of market processes’.122 The
115 Viktor J.Vanberg, The Freiburg School:Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism, Freiburg Discussion Papers on
Constitutional Economics, 04/11, 2004, 3: ‘It is apparent […] from Röpke’s report that he considered
the exchange between Eucken and von Mises to be symbolic of a conflict of opinion that, as he notes,
repeatedly resurfaced within the Mont Pelerin Society.And, indeed, Eucken and von Mises represent,
with their respective works, two distinctively different perspectives on the nature of the liberal market
order and the role of economic policy.’
116 Oles Andriychuk, supra n. 19, 581–583.
117 Stephen Martin, Issues in Competition Law and Policy 60 (Wayne D. Collins ed., American Bar
Association Publishing 2008): ‘In the Ordoliberal view, the overriding goal of competition policy was
to maintain individual freedom; efficiency in an economic sense was an implied, but subsidiary,
purpose.’
118 Edward N.Megay, Anti-Pluralist Liberalism:The German Neoliberals, 85 Pol. Sci. Q. 429–430 (1970):‘The
neoliberals are concerned over the availability of meaningful choices of action, not for the powerful
but for the powerless or weak members of society. Hence they reject not only all autocratic and
totalitarian regimes but also […] the social effects of capitalism both of the Manchester and the social
Darwinist variety.’
119 William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 Emory L. J. 14 (1995).
120 Wernhard Möschel, German Neo-Liberals, and the Social Market Economy 148 (Alan Peacock & Hans
Willgerodt eds.,The Macmillan Press 1989).
121 Maurizio Lazzarato, Neoliberalism in Action: Inequality, Insecurity and the Reconstruction of the Social, 26
Theory Culture Socy. 117 (2009) : ‘The market and competition are the result of a construction that
requires a multiplicity of interventions, particularly from the state, having constitutive effects on both
economic and non-economic conditions necessary for “laissez-faire” to exist and function.’
122 Viktor V. Vanberg, Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast between Free-Market Liberalism and
Constitutional Liberalism, 10 Const. Pol. Econ. 220 (1999) (emphasis in the original).
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concerns of the market structure are not peculiar to Ordoliberalism only. Similar
issues helped in designing the US antitrust rules, where the protection of the
entrepreneurial freedom of small and medium undertakings played a significant
role,123 which was particularly visible during Wilson’s presidency.124 These views
were dominating in the development of antitrust rules. According to the US
Congress, ‘[competition is an interaction between two great forces, which are]
corrective of each other, and both ought to exist. Both ought to be under
restraint’.125 Though this approach has been severely criticized for being
formalistic if not misleading,126 the criticism cannot remove the individual
freedom to compete from the list of constitutional values in liberal democracies.127
Ordoliberalism protects the individual right of weaker companies, while the
Austrian School addresses the demands of stronger companies to run their
activities without significant regulatory corrections of the market process.128
Competition taken from this perspective is seen as ‘the voluntary pursuit of
gain’.129 The former therefore emphasizes the egalitarian vision of the individual
right to compete, while the latter bases its arguments on the meritocratic perception
of this right. Austrians reject the institutional framework, which guarantees to the
competitors the ability to participate in the market process. Instead, they
emphasize the consumer’s possibility to decide upon the role of each competitor
in the laissez-faire exchange system.130 Perceiving competition as a ‘dynamic
rivalry’,131 Austrians support the right of the market participants to benefit from
their successful performances, and not to share their gains with less successful
opponents.This entails the protection of the right to gain by competing, and not
123 DavidW. Barnes, supra n. 24, 625.
124 Eleanor M. Fox, supra n. 15, 1148.
125 21 CONG.REC. 5956 (1890) (First Conference Report).
126 Heike Schweitzer, Technology and Competition: Contributions in Honour of Hanns Ullrich 514 (Josef Drexl,
Reto M. Hilty, Laurence Boy, Christine Godt & Bernard Remiche eds., Larcier 2009): ‘[T]he
established focus on the competitive process, resulting from the exercise of individual rights to
compete, is now being blamed for having (mis)led competition law to protect inefficient competitors.’
127 Paul H. Brietzke, The Constitutionalisation of Antitrust: Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton and Thomas C.Arthur,
22 Val. U. L. Rev. 297 (1988) (emphasis in the original): ‘Topco goes on to echo the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment: “every business, no matter how small”, “has the freedom to
compete – to assert with vigour, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it
can master” (United States v.Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972)).
128 Murray N.Rothbard, Man Economy and State – ATreatise on Economic Principles, 641 (Ludwig von Mises
Institute 2009).
129 Robert Liefmann, supra n. 91, 317.
130 Ludwig von Mises, supra n. 73, 275: ‘[Catallactic competition] is not a right, guaranteed by the state
and the laws, that would make it possible for every individual to choose ad libitum the place in the
structure of the division of labour he likes best.To assign to everybody his proper place in society is
the task of the consumers. Their buying and abstention from buying is instrumental in determining
each individual’s social position. Their supremacy is not impaired by any privileges granted to the
individual qua producers.’
131 Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process:An Austrian Approach, 35 J.
Econ. Lit. 68 (1997).
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the right to compete regardless of performance. Such a view is based on normative
individualism, a theory also developed in constitutional economics.132 According
to this principle, ‘no ‘social’ values exist apart from individual values’.133
Normative individualism does not reject the necessity of broader societal interests
but it judges that the pursuit of individual interests would eventually have positive
effects for society as a whole.Austrians are also methodological individualists; which,
according to Nozick, implies ‘that all true theories of social science are reducible to
theories of individual human action, plus boundary conditions specifying the
conditions under which persons act’.134
The second distinction is in the perception of competition as a collective right.
According to the Ordoliberal principles, which have their intellectual roots in the
US institutional theory,135 society should be based upon the principles of free
competition.This rationale is not limited to enabling the individuals to compete,
but also relies upon broader societal premises, that neither actual nor passive
individual right to participate in competition fully covers its economic, political
and cultural significance. Society as a whole benefits from competition, including
those members and institutions, which do not participate in it directly.136 This
approach is similar to the reason for protecting free speech. As Grimm points
out,137 this freedom is provided not only for those who express their views, but
also (primarily – for some) for those who consume the information, delivered by
the media, ‘producing an informed public capable of conducting its own
affairs’.138 Freedom does not necessarily have to be realized or actualized by every
member of society. Freedom’s very availability is often as important as its direct
benefits. Competition is not considered as an exclusive value, but its importance is
not defined by other values. Müller-Armack in his concept of social market
132 Christian Kirchner, supra n. 4, 521: ‘If economics shall be used as guidance for solving the [antitrust]
problems [… t]he utilitarian efficiency concept has to be given up and substituted by a concept of
normative individualism (developed by constitutional economics and normative new institutional
economics).’
133 James M. Buchanan, Fiscal Theory and Political Economy 118 (James Buchanan ed., University of North
Carolina Press 1960).
134 Robert Nozick,On Austrian Methodology, 36 Synthese 353–354 (1977) , (emphasis in the original).
135 John B. Clark & John M. Clark, The Control of Trusts 62 (Macmillan 1911): ‘Competition and its
purpose are not individual but social. […] It is not a natural state, but like any other form of liberty, it
is a social achievement.’
136 Michel Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalität II: Die Geburt der Biopolitik, 173 (Suhrkamp, 2004),
quoted and translated in Nils Goldschmidt, Hermann Rauchenschwandtner,‘The Philosophy of Social
Market Economy: Michel Foucault’s Analysis of Ordoliberalism’, Freiburg Discussion Papers on
Constitutional Economics, 07/04, 2007, 22:‘Pure competition should and can only be an objective, an
objective that accordingly requires very active policies. Competition is thus a historical objective of
governance, it is not a natural given that should be respected.’
137 Dieter Grimm, Extreme Speech and Democracy 16 (Ivan Hare & JamesWeinstein eds., Oxford University
Press 2009) .
138 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 395 US 367 (1969).
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economy proposes the irenic, peaceful coexistence of different views and values,
claiming that difference in goals and views should be ‘accepted as a given, which
however does not terminate the effort to achieve unity’.139 The presumption that
unregulated competition would lead to a better, more intensive competition is
contested by reference to the natural instinct of ‘the established firms […] to garner
the power to place roadblocks before their competitors’.140
The social function of economic competition has not been denied by the
Austrians, but their libertarian methodology suggests that such a goal could be best
achieved if economic actors were allowed to pursue their activities without
significant regulatory encroachments, perceiving antitrust regulation as one of the
most invasive.141 No successful individual is interested in living in a poor
environment, and he or she cannot erect a wall between his or her wealth and
others’ poverty; in addition his or her self-interested behaviour directly and
indirectly benefit the society as a whole, inasmuch as he or she is constantly
sharing his or her profits by further investment in long-term projects, paying taxes
or simply by spending his or her wealth and creating economic opportunities for
his or her neighbours. In addition,Austrians argue that the more lucrative the gain
is the more potential competition it generates,142 since rivals are impelled to
explore innovative techniques in order to compete successfully.143 This creates a
competitive environment, which fully covers societal interests in competition as a
collective right.
Both schools also emphasize in this respect the paramount role of the
spontaneity in market interactions, considering it as the main integrative force of
societal life in general and in economic relations in particular.144 Although the
139 Alfred Müller-Armack, Religion und Wissenschaft: Geistesgeschichtliche Hintergründe unserer Europäischen
Lebensform, 563 (Stuttgart 1981), , translated and quoted in Friedrun Quaas, Social Market Economy
History, Principles and Implementation – From A to Z, 417 (Rolf H. Hasse, Hermann Schneider & Klaus
Weigelt eds., Ferdinand Schöningh 2008).
140 Eleanor M. Fox, supra n. 15, 1180.
141 Thomas J. Di Lorenzo & Jack C.High, supra n. 74, 424.
142 Robert Liefmann, supra n. 91, 316–317: ‘[N]early all monopolies are relative monopolies, and are the
more destructive to themselves, the more they lead to actual monopoly effects, as expressed in prices.
[…]The survival of the economically strongest in the competitive struggle […] leads to monopoly, but
at the same time gives a new impetus to free competition, so that the more an acquired monopoly
position is exploited, the sooner the competitive struggle is renewed.’
143 Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 Antitrust L. J.
579–581 : ‘[There are four main principles relating competition and innovation]: [(i)] competition in
innovation itself […]; [(ii)] competition among rivals producing an existing product encourages those
firms to [develop new strategies […]; [(iii)] firms that expect to face more product market competition
after innovating have less incentive to invest in R&D […]; [(iv)] a firm will have an extra incentive to
innovate if in doing so it can discourage potential rivals from investing in R&D’.
144 Alan Peacock & Hans Willgerodt, Overall View of the German Liberal Movement, in German Neo-Liberals,
and the Social Market Economy 7 (Alan Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., The Macmillan Press 1989):
‘The disagreement between the two groups [Ordoliberals and Austrians] lay in an empirical matter.
Would monopolies simply disappear in a ‘gale of creative destruction’ […] or, as Lutz thought, be like
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notion of ‘spontaneous order’ is associated with Hayek, it was Röpke, an
Ordoliberal thinker, who coined the term, or rather borrowed it from the
philosophy of Mill and applied it to the twentieth century’s economic context.145
The visions of spontaneous order significantly differ between the two schools. In
some sense the ecology-anatomy analogy146 of the nature of society can be relevant
to understanding this difference. The ecological vision of the spontaneous order
perceives individuals as autonomous entities, mostly interested in perusing their own
interests.Their behaviour should not be necessarily dictated by other participants,
but it is in their interests to take the preferences and habits of these participants
into account, and to model their market strategies accordingly.The anatomical view
recognizes the autonomy of individual actors, but acknowledges the absolute
necessity of coordination and subordination. The participants in the competitive
process cannot always design appropriate rules for their behaviour without
elements of coordination.While the ecological vision emphasizes the coexistence of
market-players, the anatomical approach stresses the necessity of harmonious
non-intrusive subjection to common rules, which regulate the emanations of such
spontaneity in the market process. Both recognize the significance of spontaneity
and some elements of coordination. This prevents the former from sliding down
into radical anarchism and the latter from transforming into interventionism and
collectivisim.While both systems are rather theoretical constructs and can hardly
exist in practice, the Austrian vision would potentially correspond to the ecological
perception of the spontaneous order, whereas the Ordoliberal approach is closer to
the anatomical one.
Hayek perceives the origins of such regulatory approach of economic
freedom in ‘two different traditions in the theory of liberty’.147 The first is based
on the principles of spontaneity, the second originates from design; tracing them
back to Hume’s empiricism and Descartes’ rationality – and to ancient Rome and
Greece on one hand and Sparta on the other. Popper suggests in this respect that
the struggle between empiricism and rationalism is among the most important
issues in the history of modern philosophy, explaining that it was Kant ‘who tried
to offer some synthesis – a compromise, or rather, a modified form of
empiricism’,148 or rather to reject pure rationalism. Leaving Hayek’s normative
criticism of the latter aside, his observation is important to show the discursive
‘soap bubbles’ which burst under competitive pressure; or would it not be possible for entrenched
monopolies to develop in defiance, rather than as a consequence, of state action’?
145 John P. Bladel, Against Polanyi-Centrism: Hayek and the Re-Emergence of ‘Spontaneous Order’, 8 Q. J.
Austrian Econ. 23 (2005).
146 Evelyn L. Forget, Jean-Baptiste Say and Spontaneous Order, 33 Hist. Pol. Econ. 198 (2001).
147 Friedrich A. von Hayek, supra n. 77, 229.
148 Karl R. Popper,What is Dialectic?, 49 Mind 414 (1940).
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nature of the two approaches,149 and their dialectical interdependence. This is a
Hegelian perception of the contradictions between the two wings of liberalism,150
which emphasizes the tensions between the schools, their joint support of the
competitive process and common opposition towards welfare-exclusivity in
antitrust analysis. Although usually the protection of competition as an individual
right and as a collective right is perceived jointly, some authors contrast them.151
The third difference is closely related to the former two and concerns the
polar perception of the role of the State in protecting and enhancing the
competitive process. The Austrian School relies upon laissez-faire values,
promoting the self-correcting force of the market, which ‘can surely not be meant
to imply the notion of a market without any rules’,152 requiring governmental
protection of fundamental economic rights, while this protection is perceived with
a particular suspicion, as ‘[t]here is no other planning for freedom and general
welfare than to let the market system work’.153 The Ordoliberal approach in this
respect is closer to the paternalistic methods.The latter view is based on the tragic
experience of Germany’s past, when political, cultural and economic competition
have been severely oppressed by participants in the process.154 This implies that the
enhancement of the competitive process should not be perceived as a natural
evolutionary process, but should be conducted by a responsible regulator, the
primary task of which is to design within the framework of Ordnungspolitik
(which is ‘the principal method by which the general working properties of the
market process can be deliberately shaped’)155 the universal rules of the
competitive games and to correct the game when it is not going on properly.The
rules are designed and governed by institutions, and competition is a synthetic,
149 Friedrich A. von Hayek, supra n. 77, 230: ‘Though these two groups are now commonly lumped
together as the ancestors of modern liberalism, there is hardly a greater contrast imaginable than that
between their respective conceptions of the evolution and functioning of a social order and the role
played in it by liberty’.
150 Karl R. Popper, supra n. 147, 416:‘[Hegel] simply said that contradictions do not matter.They just have
to occur in the development of thought and reason. […;] reality, is not something fixed once and for
ever, but that it is developing – that we live in a world of evolution’.
151 Jonathan Faull, supra n. 16, 12: ‘[T]he notion that we are protecting economic freedom […] has
impaired the interpretation of Art. [101…]. Two groups have emerged: those who believe that the
objective of Art. [101] is to protect people’s freedom to act, and those (amongst whom I count myself)
who believe that the objective of Art. [101] is to protect the process of competition’.
152 Viktor J.Vanberg, supra n. 114, 5 (emphasis in the original).
153 Ludwig von Mises, Planning for Freedom and Twelve Other Essays and Addresses, 17 (Ludwig von Mises
ed., Libertarian Press, 1974).
154 Lawrence A. Sullivan &Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 16 Berkeley J. Intl. L.
215 (1998): ‘One of the […] teachings of the Freiburg School is that liberty, if not protected by law,
may abolish itself. […] Hitler’s election as a dictator, achieved under the liberal and democratic
Weimar constitution (1919), was a political illustration of the same phenomenon.’
155 Viktor J.Vanberg, supra n. 12, 13.
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created rather than organic and natural process.156 The competitive markets
constitute a very delicate model, and their development should be performed not
only for their own sake, but also in a harmonious balancing with other important
societal interests. The difference between the two deontological antitrust visions
dialectically internalizes Peritz’s dilemma of free competition.157
The combined Ordo-Austrian perception of competition can be based upon
two programmatic statements: (i) the competitive process constitutes an important
economic right – which, without denying the significance of economic
outcomes,158 should not be subordinated to and measured by the standards of
welfare/efficiency; (ii) competition is an important tool for evolution, innovation
and economic progress.159 The former thesis is of a legal nature; the second is
economic.
Both schools agree that competition brings prosperity and growth, and
methodologically disentangle the outcomes of competition from its ethical
constitutional significance. Although none of them is a purely ethical theory, as
most of their representatives were economists, who are usually deemed to take into
account the outcomes of the competitive process.This is particularly the case for the
social market economy wing of Ordoliberalism160 as well as for the Austrians’
consequentialist justification of the free market.161 However, alongside this
economic consequentialism, both theories are supported by strong normative
claims related to the theory of rights.This feature distinguishes the premises of the
Austrian School from the Chicago approach to competition.Aside from historical
differences, related to the fact that the Chicago School has been considered as a
mainstream antitrust theory, while the Austrian approach is seen mostly as a
heterodox vision, leaving it more room for the elaboration of non-empirical
normative claims without direct application in the economic life, the main
methodological difference between Austrians and Chicagoans is that the latter rely
exclusively on economic analysis, referring to the empirical fact that the principles
156 Nils Goldschmidt & Hermann Rauchenschwandtner, The Philosophy of Social Market Economy: Michel
Foucault’s Analysis of Ordoliberalism, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics, 07/04,
2007, 2:‘[T]he idea of competition as ‘eidos’ (instead of a natural given) is central to ordoliberalism’.
157 Rudolph J. Peritz, supra n. 2, 264: ‘What do we want to free competition from? Do we want to free it
from governmental power? Or from market power?’
158 Roger Zäch, Economic Theory and Competition Law 122–123 (Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joël
Monéger eds., Edward Elgar 2009) : ‘The underlying rationale is that freedom to compete leads to
competition and competition leads to economic and social welfare.’
159 Wolfgang Kerber, The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics 501 (Peter J. Boettke ed., Edward Elgar
1994): ‘It has always been as essential characteristic of German [as well as Austrian] market process
theory that competition was understood as producing economic and technical progress’.
160 Viktor J.Vanberg, supra n. 114, 2.
161 Norman P. Barry, The New Liberalism, 13 British J. Pol. Sci. 93 (1983): ‘Broadly speaking, libertarians
may be divided into two groups; ‘consequentialists’ and ‘rights’ theorists. […]The consequentialist
libertarians […] maintain that […] benefits to society at large come spontaneously from the pursuit of
individual satisfactions.’
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of competition work best, while the former merely supplement their political theory
by reference to this empirical fact.162 The positivist approach, which Barry
attributes to the Chicago School, is typical of the economic reasoning in general.
It should not be either criticized or eliminated, since its normative simplicity ‘what
is good must be right’ eliminates many misunderstandings, making the method of
economics work. However, workability is not the sole feature of societal systems, and
those theories which apart from a sound economic analysis develop a normative
theoretical support can address the same set of problems both in consequentialist as
well as in deontological terms.163 Both approaches did not ignore social needs, but
considered that these issues should be resolved via taxation rather than antitrust.164
The Chicago School, however, limited competition analysis to its welfare-effects,
while Austrians emphasized the importance of the competitive process, which goes
beyond neoclassical calculus.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The deontological ethos is important for both Ordoliberalism and Austrianism. A
deontological perception of competition means that the competitive process
should not be measured nor legitimized by its eventual positive impact on the
economy.165 According to Hayek, ‘a highly developed commercial spirit is itself as
much the product as the condition of effective competition [… W]e know of no
other method of producing it that to throw competition open to all who want to
take advantage of the opportunities it offers’.166 The reduction of competition to
its positive, welfare-enhancing elements removes the peculiar features of the
competitive process like ‘chance, uncertainty, and unpredictability in human
life’,167 which were most clearly advocated by the Austrian School. Kerber puts
the issue of uncertainty into a broader theoretical perspective, describing different
162 Norman P. Barry, supra n. 160, 95–96: ‘The Chicago School of Economics is systematically positivist.
[…]Its followers not only accept the distinction between fact and value but also implicitly accept the
highly dubious metaphysical proposition that, apart from the tautologies of mathematics and formal
logic, the only meaningful statements are observational statements (even if the purported observations
are theoretical rather than practicable). […] Any theoretical proposition not derived from experience
must be purely tautologous and therefore incapable of conveying empirical knowledge’.
163 Norman P. Barry, supra n. 160, 121.
164 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, supra n. 110, 245: ‘If efficiency goals and distributive goals can really be
separated, then it would appear that the duty of the Chicago School antitrust policymaker is to look
only at the efficiency effects of a policy and ignore any distributional effects. Unpopular distributional
effects can be corrected later by a different policy.’
165 Jonathan Wolff, Libertarianism, Utility and Economic Competition, 92 Va L. Rev. 1606–1607 (2006) :
‘[T]hose that reject consequentialist reasoning, such as deontological libertarians, are not entitled to
avail themselves of [… utilitarian] solutions.’
166 Friedrich A. von Hayek,The Political Order of a Free People, vol. 3, 73 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976).
167 Paul A. Cantor & Stephen Cox, Literature and the Economics of Liberty: Spontaneous Order in Culture xi
(Paul A. Cantor & Stephen Cox eds., Ludwig von Mises Institute 2009).
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advantages of diversity as explored in different disciplines.168 The inevitability of
uncertainty and the possibility of its fruitful internalization into the philosophy of
science has been emphasized by Polanyi.169 Ordoliberal thinkers as Hoppmann
also emphasized the importance of the freedom to compete, perceiving it as part of
the essence of the economic constitution,170 and a goal in itself.171 For
Hoppmann the outcomes of the competitive process ‘are inherently unpredictable
[… and] market outcomes can rarely be unambiguously attributed to individual
acts’,172 as freedom and predictability seldom coincide.
By constitutionalization of the competitive process, it has been argued that
both welfare and competition are important public goods.173 This approach brings
together economic and political freedoms.174
The criticism which such a perception of competition can generate is
manifold, though it can be reduced to two major aspects: (i) empirical and (ii)
normative:
(i) On the empirical side, the dis-equilibration of competition raises concerns
about its proper definition, measurement and evaluation. As Hughes argues, the
alternative to the mainstream antitrust analysis should not be limited to its
criticism and promotion of empty slogans, suggesting that ‘[t]he Chicago School
approach is successful in large part because it is based on economic principles that
are simple enough to be manageable’.175 Indeed, by abandoning the
methodological framework of perfect competition, the competitive process
abandons also the potential for being defined in economically verifiable terms.
This problem has two connected solutions, an apologetic and an apagogical one.The
former reveals that it was the intention of the founders of the concept of
competition as a discovery process of ‘challenge and response’,176 to eliminate the
predictability of competition. Hayek emphasizes that it is exactly the essence of
competition, which requires it to remain unpredictable and immeasurable, thus
168 Wolfgang Kerber, supra n. 89, 177–179.
169 Michael Polanyi,TheValue of the Inexact, 3 Phil. Sci. 233 (1936).
170 Wolfgang Kerber & Ulrich Schwalbe, supra n. 43, 229–230: ‘On the basis of [… the] Ordoliberal ideas
[Erich] Hoppmann developed his concept of freedom of competition in the late 1960s and the 1970s.
[…] On the normative level, he criticized vehemently the view that competition is primarily an
instrument to achieve economic aims. Instead he considered individual freedom as the most important
aim. […] Freedom of competition means, on the other hand, the (entrepreneurial) freedom of firms
[…] and, on the other hand, the freedom of buyers and sellers.’
171 Erich Hoppmann, Wettbewerb als Norm derWettbewerbspolitik, 18 Ordo – Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 79 (1967), translated and quoted inViktor J.Vanberg, supra n. 12, 9.
172 Heike Schweitzer, supra n. 125, 522.
173 Viktor J.Vanberg, supra n. 114, 15.
174 Patricia Owens, The Ethic of Reality in Hannah Arendt 151 (Oxford University Press 2008): ‘Politics and
freedom, public freedom, are fundamentally ends in themselves.’
175 Edwin J. Hughes, supra n. 59, 287.
176 Donald Dewey,The EconomicTheory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50Va. L. Rev. 421 (1964).
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abandoning scientism.177 Competition thereby abandons to a large extent the
realm of science, not being subject to verifiability requirements, and shifts to the
realm of ideological choices in society, something, which can be justified
intuitively, as a matter of societal culture, but not defined in the pragmatic language
of economic analysis. The apagogical explanation operationalizes an a contrario
argument, according to which the predictions and measurements of such
important economic values, by which competition is often measured, as consumer
or total welfare, industrial growth, innovation and market integration similarly fail
to meet the unanimous standard of evaluation.The evolution of competition law
shows that each of these concepts holds significant elements of ambiguity,
inductive context-dependency and multiple meanings.178
(ii) The normative argument supports the empirical one, and mitigates the
difficulties related to the dis-equilibration of the competitive process.
Acknowledgment of the constitutional importance of competitive process and its
perception as a paramount value of liberal democracy does not prioritize
competition or immunize it against regulatory limitations. Pluralistic democracies
constantly face the necessity to make choices between equally important societal
values.These values therefore compete with each other for being prioritized by the
decision-makers.179 By disentangling competition from utilitarian values, the
regulator will be able to decide which of the values is more important in each
particular case. While measurable values would argue their case by applying the
economic rationale of equilibrium-based reasoning, more deontological values
would participate in this competition using their own specific deontological
instruments. This approach would benefit from the elements of competing
interdisciplinary methods, which as Kerber argues are necessary for defining and
regulating the normative foundations of competition law,180 and undermine the
influential holistic view that ‘only efficiency and consumer welfare are appropriate
normative goals of competition law’.181
The methodological similarities of these deontological schools should not be
oversimplified. This synthetic unification is made for epistemological purposes
only, in order to articulate the dynamic aspects of the market process, which both
schools support. They are taken jointly therefore only to illustrate their
deontological approaches to competition, which differ to a large extent, but often
complement each other, if taken from the dialectical stand.This artificial epistemic
177 Friedrich A. von Hayek, supra n. 77, 10 (emphasis in the original): ‘[T]he validity of the theory of
competition can never be empirically verified for those cases in which it is of interest.’
178 Heike Schweitzer, supra n. 125, 513: ‘Various conceptions of a “more economic approach” compete
with each other’.
179 Maher M.Dabbah, supra n. 32, 54–55.
180 Wolfgang Kerber, supra n. 17, 18.
181 Roger J.Van den Bergh & Peter D. Camesasca, supra n. 62, 18.
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model helps to address the essence of competition as a phenomenon, without
focusing on ideological issues, which constantly arise in such a paradoxical area of
law as antitrust.182 The two deontological doctrines significantly differ in respect
to their broader views on the role of public instruments in the regulation of
economic affairs and therefore are seldom considered as theoretical allies. The
hypothesis of this research is that, despite substantial ideological discrepancies, the
deontological antitrust schools hold the same methodological views concerning
the conceptual independency of the competitive process; adhering to its separation
from the outcomes, which it can deliver for society. Regardless of their ideological
differences (and in some dialectical sense ‘due to’ these differences) the two
deontological approaches reinforce each other. It is important therefore to
articulate the methodological similarities of the deontological antitrust schools. As
Heinemann argues,183 the emphasis on the discovering nature of the competitive
process is an ideologically neutral concept, which can be in conformity with
interventionist policy as well as with a libertarian one. The synthesis of
Ordoliberalism and Austrianism provides a theoretical paradigm where the liberal
constitutionalism of the former supplements and invigorates the constitutional
liberalism of the latter,184 without solving the dilemmatic relations between the
two, but placing them into a dialectical interplay of strong government, protecting
multiple goals, among which the freedom to compete holds an important position.
182 Yane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 597 (2007): ‘The
paradox of this field of law is evident – antitrust tries to save the market mechanism from itself –
which means that it has no strong friends either among free-marketers or interventionists.’
183 Andreas Heinemann, Competition Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations 210–211
(Josef Drexl,Wolfgang Kerber & Rupprecht Podszun eds., Edward Elgar 2011).
184 Viktor J.Vanberg, Liberal Constitutionalism, Constitutional Liberalism and Democracy, Freiburg Discussion
Papers on Constitutional Economics, 09/04, 2009, 9.
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